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Finally, a True Elements Test
MATHIS V. UNITED STATES AND THE
CATEGORICAL APPROACH
Rebecca Sharpless†
INTRODUCTION
The fate of defendants facing lengthy federal sentences
based on recidivism often turns on what the U.S. Supreme Court
calls the categorical approach.1 This methodology dictates
whether a prior conviction can serve as a predicate for imposing
a longer, or enhanced, federal sentence.2 Federal defendants
might serve an additional decade, or longer, in prison based
solely on having a prior conviction of a certain type. Under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), for example, people who
commit a federal firearm offense serve a fifteen-year mandatory
minimum sentence if they have three prior convictions for a
“violent felony” or a “serious drug offense.”3
The Court’s recent jurisprudence on sentencing
enhancements requires strict correspondence between the
underlying predicate conviction and the federal statutory ground
for imposing a longer sentence.4 The Court’s decisions come at a
time when many have questioned the wisdom of mass
incarceration.5 Over the last five decades, the United States has
Clinical Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
For a description and history of the categorical approach, see infra Part I.
2 See infra note 3.
3 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012); see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 2K2.1, 4B1.1, 4B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016) (providing for firearm and
career offender enhancements to federal sentences).
4 See infra Section I.C.
5 In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson called for a “War on Crime,” a
pronouncement that ushered in a new era of law enforcement. James Vorenberg, The
War on Crime: The First Five Years, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1972, at 63. Many have
critiqued the ensuing decades of mass incarceration. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER,
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010);
MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS (2014); Elizabeth Hinton, Why We Should Reconsider the War on Crime, TIME
(Mar. 20, 2015), http://time.com/3746059/war-on-crime-history/ [https://perma.cc/F2ZUJ5LQ]; Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the
“War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381 (2002); Michael
†
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become the world’s largest jailer, with one in thirty-six adults
incarcerated or under correctional supervision.6 The United
States’ incarceration rate is at least three and a half times
greater than that of Europe.7 In taking great care to delimit the
circumstances in which federal sentencing judges can lengthen
sentences based on recidivism, the Court has softened the
edges of harsh federal sentencing practices.
The Court’s categorical approach for assessing the nature
of a prior conviction for sentencing enhancement also governs
most immigration cases involving removal for a criminal
offense.8 In the past, many lawfully present immigrants facing
removal for a crime could apply for a discretionary waiver based
on whether their individual equities outweighed their criminal
histories.9 Amendments to immigration law wrought by the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,
however, both expanded the grounds for removal and cut back
discretionary relief for immigrants with criminal records.10 As
Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race
and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral
Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271
(2004); SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
rd_ICCPR%20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DK
Q-V4BA]; Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of Drug and Crime
Control Policies on Black Americans, in THINKING ABOUT PUNISHMENT: PENAL POLICY
ACROSS SPACE, TIME AND DISCIPLINE 81 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009).
6 DANIELLE KAEBLE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014 (2015), https://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus14.pdf [https://perma.cc/SN3R-QS57]; Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes,
U.S. Locks People Up at a Higher Rate than Any Other Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-people-upat-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/ [https://perma.cc/GUD6-TFQF].
7 Ye Hee Lee, supra note 6.
8 The statutory grounds for removal include both the grounds of inadmissibility
and deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2012) (criminal grounds of inadmissibility
governing the admission of noncitizens into the United States); id. § 1227(a)(2) (criminal
grounds of deportation governing the expulsion of noncitizens out of the United States).
9 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(c) (1995) (providing a broad discretionary waiver to
deportation for lawful permanent residents); In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85
(B.I.A. 1978) (describing positive factors such as rehabilitation, family and community
ties, and hardship).
10 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 321–34, 110 Stat. 3009-627–35 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2012)); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277–78 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2012)). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, the Immigration Act of 1990, the Immigration
and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, and the IIRIRA of 1996 expanded
the definition of aggravated felony. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100690, § 7342, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469–70 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43));
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 501, 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (codified as
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the Court has observed, “recent changes in our immigration law
have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class
of noncitizen offenders.”11 By demanding that convictions used
for removal strictly correspond to a federal removal ground, the
Court has provided some convicted noncitizens with a defense
against removal.
Adjectives invoked to describe the categorical approach
include “perplexing,” “counterintuitive,” and “extremely
complicated.”12 Courts complain of the amount of ink spilled on
deciphering what the categorical approach requires in specific
cases.13 Practitioners spend hours training, researching, and
writing to understand and apply the approach to their cases.14
As mind-bending as it may be, the categorical approach is
anything but abstract to those whose lives are at stake. In
recognition of the importance of the categorical approach to
noncitizens with a criminal record, the American Bar Association
has “urge[d] U.S. immigration authorities to interpret
immigration laws in accordance with the categorical approach.”15
For years, commentators have argued that sentencing
courts and immigration adjudicators should apply the categorical
approach as a “true elements test.”16 Under an elements test,
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)); Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305, 4320–21 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)).
11 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010).
12 Doug Keller, Causing Mischief for Taylor’s Categorical Approach: Applying
“Legal Imagination” to Duenas-Alvarez, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625, 625 (2011); see
Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010); Transcript of Oral Argument at
50, Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (No. 11-9540) (Alito, J.).
13 See United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (stating, “In the twenty years since [the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in] Taylor,”
the Ninth Circuit has “struggled to understand the contours of the Supreme Court’s”
categorical approach, pronouncing that “over the past decade, perhaps no other area of the
law has demanded more of [the court’s] resources”), abrogated by Descamps v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). At the 2016 Annual National Seminar, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission noted that “[a]fter the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathis v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 2242 (2016), courts continue to grapple with the categorical approach, including
the means vs. elements test.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CATEGORICAL APPROACH: 2016
ANNUAL NATIONAL SEMINAR (2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/
annual-national-training-seminar/2016/backgrounder_categorical-approach.pdf [https://
perma.cc/593F-5DDA].
14 For example, the Immigrant Defense Project has issued numerous practice
advisories and other resources on the categorical approach. See, e.g., IMMIGRANT DEF.
PROJECT, USING AND DEFENDING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH, http://www.immdefense.
org/using-and-defending-the-categorical-approach/ [https://perma.cc/6YTC-HJBN].
15 See COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION STANDING
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration_Consequences_of_Past_Criminal_Convictions_
1.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ5Y-EAZV].
16 See, e.g., Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a True Elements Test: Taylor and the
Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (2008);
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adjudicators look only to the constitutive legal elements of a
criminal offense, as defined by statute or case law, to categorize a
crime.17 The elements of a criminal offense are those “necessary”
facts about which jurors must agree in every case prosecuted
under a statute.18 Elements contrast with “means,” which are
different ways in which an individual can commit the elements of
a crime.19
States enjoy wide latitude to decide whether terms used
to describe a given criminal offense are elements or means.20 A
fact that constitutes an element in one state may be only a
means in another. For example, two states might have drug
statutes that each criminalize the “sale or delivery” of controlled
substances as a first degree felony. These alternatives could
denote either elements or means. Sale involves commercial
dealing, whereas delivery does not because it includes social
sharing.21 In immigration law, commercial dealing is required
for an offense to qualify as an “illicit trafficking” aggravated
felony.22 A conviction that includes social sharing does not
necessarily involve commercial dealing and is not an aggravated
felony. Suppose that, in one state, courts consider the statutory
phrase “sale or delivery” to define two separate offenses. In
contrast, the second state’s judiciary regards the phrase “sale
or delivery” as describing two different means of committing
the offense of drug trafficking. Prosecutors in the second state
have the option of listing “sale or delivery” as alternate means
in a single count.23 To convict, jurors need not agree about
whether the defendant engaged in sale, which must involve a
commercial transaction, or delivery, which does not. Because a
conviction under the second state’s “sale or delivery” statute
would not necessarily involve commercial dealing, it would not
qualify as an “illicit trafficking” aggravated felony.
To apply the categorical approach as an elements test is
to look only to the elements to determine whether the offense
Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011).
17 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247–50 (2016).
18 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
19 Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 638–39 (1991) (plurality decision).
20 Id. at 639 (A “state legislature’s definition of the elements of the offense is
usually dispositive.” (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85 (1986))).
21 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013) (recognizing that
“distribution” includes distribution “for no remuneration”).
22 Illicit trafficking under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012) requires commercial
dealing. See In re Sanchez-Cornejo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 273, 274 (B.I.A. 2010) (citing In re
Davis, 20 I. & N. Dec. 536, 541 (B.I.A. 1992)).
23 For a discussion of how alternate means can be charged in a single count,
see infra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
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triggers the federal consequence defined by federal sentencing
or immigration law. Adjudicators cannot rely on non-element
facts that might appear in a record of conviction to describe
how the defendant was alleged to have committed the offense.
In Descamps v. United States and Mathis v. United States, both
ACCA opinions authored by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court
not only adopted an elements test but also declared that the
Court had already done so over two decades ago. Justice Kagan
wrote for the eight-to-one majority in Descamps: “Our caselaw
explaining the categorical approach and its ‘modified’
counterpart all but resolves this case.”24 Three years later, in her
opening paragraph in Mathis, she echoed the same sentiment:
“For more than 25 years, our decisions have held that the prior
crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate [offense leading to
sentencing enhancement] if, but only if, its elements are the
same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense”—the
offense described in the ACCA as triggering a longer sentence.25
Disputing Justice Kagan’s claim of settled law, Justice Breyer
and Justice Ginsburg, two justices who had been in the majority
in Descamps, dissented in Mathis.26
This article analyzes the trajectory of the Court’s
principal categorical approach decisions, using the Mathis
dissent authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice
Ginsburg, to explain an ambiguity in the Court’s jurisprudence
that the discussions of means and elements in Descamps and
Mathis have now settled. Justice Kagan’s oversimplification has
led her not only to overstate the relationship between the
Court’s early and late categorical approach decisions but also to
include dicta in Mathis that leaves room for confusion about how
to apply the categorical approach in practice.27 The dicta suggest
that adjudicators can take a “peek” at the record of conviction to
help determine whether state law has defined a fact as a means
or an element.28 This article argues that Descamps and Mathis,
when properly interpreted, require the categorical approach to
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013).
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247 (2016). The term “‘generic’
federal definition” means that the “offenses must be viewed in the abstract, to see
whether the state statute shares the nature of the federal offense that serves as a point
of comparison.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013). A state conviction is
a “categorical match with a generic federal offense only if a conviction of the state
offense ‘necessarily involved . . . facts equating to [the] generic [federal offense].’” Id.
(alteration in original) (omission in original) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13, 24 (2005)).
26 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27 See infra Part IV.
28 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256–57 (quoting Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466,
473–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (Graber, J., dissenting)).
24
25
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operate as a true elements test and that the take a “peek”
language in Mathis is inconsistent with the case’s holding.
This article begins with a brief description of the origins
of the categorical approach in the context of federal sentencing
law. This description focuses on Taylor v. United States,
Shepard v. United States, and their relationship to the Court’s
recent decisions in Descamps v. United States and Mathis v.
United States.29 Part II analyzes the jurisprudential divergence
between the Mathis majority and Justice Breyer’s dissent. The
majority and the dissent disagree over what it means for a fact
relating to a prior conviction to have been “necessarily” decided.
Part III argues that, although Taylor and Shepard did not
dictate the results in Descamps and Mathis, the latter cases
were correctly decided. The statutory requirement that recidivist
sentencing and deportation require a “conviction” compels their
holdings. Moreover, the resolution of these cases avoids a serious
constitutional issue and is fair and practical. Part IV argues that
the dicta in Mathis, which suggests that adjudicators can take a
“peek” at the record of conviction to help decide whether
statutory alternatives are means or elements, is misguided and
contradicts the Mathis holding.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH

The Supreme Court has described states as the great
laboratories of our nation’s democracy.30 In the realm of
criminal justice, each state has the authority to define, and
redefine, what counts as a crime.31 This multiplicity makes it
difficult to standardize the federal sentencing and deportation
consequences of state offenses, however. Because state offenses
are numerous and ever-changing, it is impractical for federal
sentencing enhancement and federal deportation laws to crossreference specific state criminal laws. Moreover, state labels for
crimes cannot control the federal analysis, as states sometimes
use different labels for the same offense.32 Even when states
use the same label, the elements of the offenses might differ.33
29 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); Shepard v. United States,
544 U.S. 13 (2005); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013); Mathis, 136
S. Ct. at 2243.
30 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
31 See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text.
32 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588–89 (1990).
33 See Iris Bennett, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration
Consequences of “Aggravated Felony” Convictions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1696, 1720–21
(1999) (describing how states use different labels for crimes and “define the requisite
elements . . . differently”).
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In the face of these “vagaries of state law,”34 federal courts seek
a standardized way to categorize convictions for the federal
purposes of recidivist sentencing and deportation.
The Supreme Court has adopted the categorical approach
to ascertain whether a criminal conviction qualifies as a predicate
offense for a federal consequence.35 As explained below,
adjudicators look at the elements of the conviction, not the way the
crime was committed, and compare the elements with a generic
definition contained in federal sentencing or immigration law.36
A.

What the Jury “Necessarily Had to Find”: Taylor v.
United States

While the basic principles underlying the categorical
approach first appeared in federal court immigration cases in
the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s first
articulation appeared in Taylor v. United States, four years after
Congress enacted the Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986
(the Act) as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.37 Under the
Act, federal defendants convicted of unlawful possession of a
firearm faced an increased maximum possible sentence if they
had three prior convictions of certain types, including
“burglary.”38 In Taylor, the Court rejected the view of the lower
court that “burglary” in the Act “means ‘burglary’ however a state
chooses to define it.”39 Instead, the Court found that the Act
required sentencing judges to employ a “generic” definition of
burglary, which the Court defined as the “unlawful or
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure,
with intent to commit a crime.”40 Federal sentencing courts look
“only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to
the particular facts underlying those convictions.”41 Based on the
statute’s use of the term “convictions,” legislative history, and
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588.
See infra notes 37–49 and accompanying discussion.
36 See infra Sections I.A–I.D.
37 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588; see Career Criminal Amendments Act of 1986,
H.R. 4885, 99th Cong. (1986); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat.
3207. In the 1914 immigration case United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, the court of
appeals asked whether the criminal conviction under review “necessarily involve[d]
moral turpitude.” United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 862 (2d Cir. 1914).
For a history of the categorical approach in immigration law, see Sharpless, supra note
16, at 994–97; Das, supra note 16, at 1688–98.
38 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012) (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (unlawful
possession of a firearm)).
39 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 579, 592 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 864 F.2d
625, 627 (8th Cir. 1989)).
40 Id. at 599.
41 Id. at 600.
34

35
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the “potential unfairness of a factual approach,” the Court found
that “burglary” refers “to the elements of the statute of conviction,
not to the facts of each defendant’s conduct.”42 For example, under
the Court’s rule, if a state burglary statute did not require entry
or remaining in “a building or structure,” it would not qualify as
federal burglary under the Court’s generic definition.
Although the Court sought to avoid the practical
difficulties of a sentencing court having “to determine what
[the underlying criminal] conduct was,” constitutional concerns
lingered in the background.43 Presaging Sixth Amendment
concerns that later surfaced in the Apprendi v. New Jersey line
of cases,44 the Court posited: “If the sentencing court were to
conclude, from its own review of the record, that the defendant
actually committed a generic burglary, could the defendant
challenge this conclusion as abridging his right to a jury
trial?”45 Despite this constitutional concern, the Court opened
up the possibility of a sentencing court going “beyond the mere
fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was
actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary.”46
To illustrate its point, the Court posited a hypothetical state
burglary statute that criminalized unlawful entry into “an
automobile as well as a building.”47 The Court reasoned: “[I]f
the indictment or information and jury instructions show that
the defendant was charged only with a burglary of a building,
and that the jury necessarily had to find an entry of a building
to convict, then the Government should be allowed to use the
conviction for enhancement.”48 In later cases, the justices would
disagree about what it means to say that the jury necessarily
had to find an element of a generic offense.49
B.

Reviewing the Record of Conviction in Plea Cases:
Shepard v. United States

The Court’s next major development regarding the
categorical approach came fifteen years later in Shepard v.
Id. at 600–01.
Id. at 601.
44 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, rather than a judge, find any
fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime. Id. at 490. Apprendi rendered
unlawful the practice of judges finding facts that would lengthen a defendant’s sentence.
Id. at 491–92.
45 Id.
46 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added).
47 Id.
48 Id. (emphasis added).
49 See infra Part II.
42
43
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United States.50 Shepard involved a federal enhancement under
the ACCA, which imposes a minimum fifteen-year prison
sentence on any defendant who possessed a firearm after three
prior convictions of certain types, including a “violent felony.”51
Shepard had pled guilty to multiple state offenses, including
burglary in Massachusetts. He was then convicted of the federal
offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm and faced
sentencing enhancement under the ACCA.52 At issue was
whether Shepard’s prior plea to Massachusetts burglary
qualified as a “violent felony” triggering enhancement.53
Massachusetts law punished breaking and entering a “building,
ship, vessel or vehicle,” whereas federal generic burglary,
defined in Taylor, only criminalized entry into a “building or
structure.”54 The Court reaffirmed Taylor, stating that the
categorical approach “refers to predicate offenses in terms not
of prior conduct but of prior ‘convictions’ and the ‘element[s]’ of
crimes.”55 The Court extended Taylor’s holding to plea
agreements and bench trials, rejecting the government’s position
that, in nonjury verdict cases, sentencing judges could look to
alleged facts in documents like police reports to determine
whether the conviction qualified as a generic offense.56 While the
Court permitted review of the record of conviction, it limited this
review to only the charging document, plea agreement, and any
factual basis admitted by Shepard and accepted by the judge.57
In Shepard, the Court found that these documents were a close
analogue to the documents found in jury verdict cases.58 The
Court remanded Shepard’s case for the U.S. district court to
review the record of conviction.59 The practice of looking beyond
the statute to the record of conviction later came to be known
as the “modified categorical approach.”60
As pointed out eleven years later by Justice Breyer in his
Mathis dissent, the Court in Taylor and Shepard looked beyond
the criminal statute to review the record of conviction documents
544 U.S. 13 (2005).
See id. at 15 (analyzing a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)).
52 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16.
53 Id. at 15–16. A “violent felony” includes, among other offenses, a “burglary”
offense committed by an adult that is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)(B) (2012).
54 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 15–18; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 266, § 16 (West 2000).
55 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 19 (alteration in original).
56 Id. at 16.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 19–20.
59 Id. at 26.
60 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).
50

51
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without first asking whether the statutory alternatives were
disjunctive elements that defined separate offenses or merely
different means of committing an offense defined by a single set
of elements.61
C.

The Modified Categorical Approach: Descamps v. United
States

In the 2013 case Descamps v. United States, the Court
directly addressed the circumstances under which a sentencing
judge may go beyond the statute of conviction to review the
record of conviction under the modified categorical approach.62
Descamps was convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm under federal law, and the government sought to
lengthen his sentence under the ACCA due to a prior California
burglary offense.63 Unlike generic federal burglary, California’s
burglary statute did not require an “unlawful” entry.64 The
Ninth Circuit had upheld the expansive review of record of
conviction documents when interpreting the modified categorical
approach in a prior, en banc decision.65 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve whether judges can look to the
record of conviction when analyzing statutes that contain “a
single, ‘indivisible’ set of elements sweeping more broadly than
the corresponding generic offense.”66
The Court held that because California’s burglary statute
did not “list[ ] potential offense elements in the alternative,” but
instead omitted the element of unlawful entry entirely, the
sentencing judge had erred in reviewing the record of conviction
under the modified categorical approach.67 The modified
categorical approach “serves [the] limited function” of determining
the elements of a conviction when a statute is “divisible” (i.e., when
it “list[s] potential offense elements in the alternative”).68 The
Court invoked the elements/means distinction, stating that the
“only facts the [sentencing] court can be sure the jury . . . found

Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2260 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. 2276.
63 Id. at 2282.
64 Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 2010) (“[e]very person who
enters”), with Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (holding that the
generic federal definition of burglary requires unlawful entry).
65 United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (per curiam).
66 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 2283–84; see id. at 2284 (The modified approach is merely a “tool for
implementing the categorical approach.”).
61

62
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are those constituting elements of the offense—as distinct from
amplifying but legally extraneous circumstances.”69
Descamps was an eight-to-one decision, with only
Justice Alito dissenting. Characterizing the majority opinion as
resting on “highly technical grounds,” Justice Alito preferred a
“more practical reading.”70 Namely, “[w]hen it is clear that a
defendant necessarily admitted or the jury necessarily found
that the defendant committed the elements of generic burglary,
the conviction should qualify.”71
A footnote in Justice Kagan’s majority opinion introduced
ambiguity that led to a circuit split. Responding to Justice Alito’s
concern that “distinguishing between ‘alternative elements’ and
‘alternative means’ is difficult,” Justice Kagan wrote that there
is “no real-world reason to worry” because the record of conviction
“would reflect the crime’s elements.”72 Some courts interpreted
this statement as blanket permission to review the record of
conviction whenever a statute lists alternatives, even if they are
means rather than elements.73
D.

Elements or Means: Mathis v. United States

Three years later, the Court resolved the circuit split
created by its footnote in Descamps. In Mathis v. United States,
the Court held that a court may review the record of conviction
only when a statute’s list of alternatives defines elements of
distinct offenses.74 Courts cannot review the record of conviction
when “a statute . . . lists multiple, alternative means of satisfying
one (or more) of its elements,” as defined by state law.75 As
explained above, elements are facts necessary to a conviction

69 Id. at 2288 (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)).
The Court cited with approval its prior decisions in Schad and Richardson, both of
which defined the difference between means and elements. Id. at 2298 (citing Schad v.
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (plurality); Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817).
70 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2295 (Alito, J., dissenting).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2285 n.2. She added: “When a state law is drafted in the alternative,
the court merely resorts to the approved documents and compares the elements
revealed there to those of the generic offense.” Id.
73 Compare United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 2015), overruled by
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (citing to footnote 2 of Descamps to permit
review of the record of conviction whenever statutory alternatives are listed), United States
v. Ozier, 796 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2015) (same), and United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046
(10th Cir. 2014) (same), with Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014) (barring
review of the record of conviction when the statutory alternatives are elements rather than
means), and Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2014) (same).
74 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249 (citing Schad, 501 U.S. at 636 (plurality
opinion)) (discussing the difference between elements and means).
75 Id. at 2248 (emphasis added).
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about which jurors must agree to convict a defendant.76 In
contrast, means are facts describing how the crime was
committed.77 Jurors might disagree about means but still
convict. Building off the Court’s burglary hypothetical in Taylor,
consider two states that criminalize unlawful entry into an
“automobile or structure” under their burglary statutes.78 The
first state might consider this phrase to define alternate
elements, such that the prosecutor must charge one or the other,
but not both, in the same count.79 To convict, jurors must agree
whether the entry was to a structure or conveyance. In contrast,
the second state could regard “automobile or structure” as
defining different ways of committing a single location element
of burglary. Under Mathis, review of the conviction record under
the modified categorical approach would only be permissible in
the first case.80 Only the first state regards the statutory
alternatives as distinct elements.
Mathis was an ACCA sentencing enhancement case
involving predicate convictions for Iowa burglary. Mathis had
pled guilty to the federal offense of being a felon in possession
of a firearm. The government sought the ACCA’s fifteen-year
minimum penalty because Mathis had previously been
convicted five times for burglary under Iowa law.81 Iowa’s
burglary statute is broader than generic burglary because it
criminalizes unlawful entry into places other than structures,
such as a “land, water or air vehicle.”82 Under Iowa case law,
this disjunctive phrase designated alternate means rather than
alternate elements.83 Although the record of conviction stated
that Mathis had entered a structure (a “house and garage”), the
Court found that the sentencing court was prohibited from
reviewing the record because the statute contained only a
single set of elements and was therefore not divisible into
multiple offenses.84
The Court easily answered the question of whether Iowa
treats the alternatives in its burglary statute as elements or
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
78 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (positing hypothetical
state burglary statute that includes “entry of an automobile as well as a building”).
79 See infra notes 115–116 for a discussion of how alternate elements cannot
be charged in the same count.
80 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251–54 (holding that the modified categorical
approach does not apply when statutory alternatives are means rather than elements).
81 Id. at 2250.
82 IOWA CODE § 702.12 (2013).
83 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256 (citing State v. Duncan, 312 N.W.2d 519,
523 (Iowa 1981)).
84 Id. at 2256–57.
76
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means, as the highest Iowa court had supplied a definitive
answer to this question.85 In dicta, however, the Court suggested
that federal courts might assess state law by looking beyond
state court legal interpretations to how prosecutors charge
offenses as a matter of practice.86 As discussed below, the
suggestion that federal courts take a “peek” at the record of
conviction to see how the prosecutor actually charged the crime
is misguided. It threatens to erode the Court’s holding that the
modified categorical approach turns on the purely legal question
of whether state law defines a statutory alternative as an
element or means.87
In addition to arguing that the result in Mathis was
dictated by “25 years” of cases, Justice Kagan, writing for the
majority, gave three reasons for the Court’s decision.88 First,
Congress used the term “conviction” in the ACCA instead of
“conduct.”89 Second, going beyond the elements of the conviction
would raise the Sixth Amendment issue first identified by the
Court in Taylor.90 Third, a reliance on facts that are only means
rather than elements would be unfair to defendants.91
Defendants may have no reason to contest means, or nonelement facts because jurors need not agree about them to
convict. In plea cases, non-element facts can be irrelevant to
the resolution of the case.92
Mathis was a five-to-three decision with two dissents
written by Justice Breyer and Justice Alito.93 Justice Breyer,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, rejected the majority’s elements
test, arguing that the “elements/means distinction . . . should
not matter for sentencing purposes.”94 Rather, in cases where
alternate means are listed in the statute, the sentencing court
should review the record of conviction and ask whether the jury
“necessarily found” the fact that makes the offense fit the generic
federal definition.95 When a burglary defendant is charged only
with entering a structure, a jury would have to find this fact to
85 Id. at 2256 (“This threshold inquiry—elements or means?—is easy in this
case, as it will be in many others.”).
86 Id. at 2256–57 (suggesting that federal judges can take a “peek” at the
record of conviction documents (quoting Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 473–74 (9th
Cir. 2015))).
87 See infra Part IV.
88 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247, 2252–54.
89 Id. at 2252.
90 See id. at 2252; see also supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
91 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253.
92 Id. at 2253.
93 Id. at 2247.
94 Id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 2266.
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convict. In Justice Breyer’s view, it did not matter that the
prosecutor in Mathis could have charged house or vehicle as
alternate means.96 It only mattered that the prosecutor in Mathis’s
case actually charged him with entering a house.97 Explaining
away the Court’s repeated use of the term “elements” in its prior
precedent, Justice Breyer argued that the Court was using the
term “to refer to the matter at issue” and was not employing it in
a technical sense to draw a distinction with means.98
Both Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg were in the
majority in Descamps. They justified their dissent from the
Mathis majority by pointing to the fact that Descamps involved
a statute that was missing an element entirely, while Mathis
involved an express list of statutory alternatives.99 The California
statute in Descamps was silent as to whether the entry element of
burglary had to be unlawful, such that both lawful and unlawful
entries could qualify.100 In contrast, the Iowa statute in Mathis
listed alternate means by which the location element of burglary
could be satisfied (structure or vehicle).101 For Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg, recourse to the record of conviction in cases involving
overbroad elements like Descamps constitutes impermissible factfinding because in no sense did the jury “necessarily” find the fact
that triggers enhancement.102 But, for them, the same concern
does not exist in cases like Mathis where the statute expressly
lists alternatives, and only one alternative appears in the record
of conviction.103
The next section illuminates the difference between the
Mathis majority and the dissent.

Id.
Id.
98 Id. at 2265.
99 Id. at 2266.
100 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2282 (2013).
101 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2246, 2265–66 (drawing a distinction between Descamps
where the “statute made no distinction” between alternatives and the statute in Mathis that
listed “several statutory alternatives”).
102 See id. at 2259–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
103 Although Justices Breyer and Ginsburg cite to footnote two of the Descamps
majority opinion as support for their position, that footnote makes no distinction between
statutes that contain a list of alternatives and statutes with overbroad elements. Id. at 2264;
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2 (discussing statutory “lists”). Nor did the Court’s plurality
decision in Schad, upon which the Descamps majority relied. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2298
(citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991) (plurality)). Schad is a leading case on the
difference between means and elements. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Justice
Breyer and Ginsburg give no explanation for why Descamps would have cited to Schad if
the means/elements distinction were irrelevant to the divisibility inquiry, as they contend.
96
97
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WHAT THE JURY “NECESSARILY” DECIDED

The Mathis majority and the Breyer dissent diverged on
the issue of what it means for a fact to be necessarily decided.
The majority accused the dissent of permitting judges to rely
on “extraneous” facts—facts not necessary for the conviction,
facts that the defendant may not have had the incentive to
dispute at trial.104 The dissenters, in contrast, contended that
they were requiring sentencing judges to characterize a prior
conviction based only on what the jury had necessarily found
(or what the jury would have necessarily found if the case had
proceeded to trial).105 In other words, both sides believed that they
were faithfully applying the Taylor rule that the characterization
of a prior conviction must only rely on the “necessarily” found, or
essential, facts.106
The true disagreement was about what it means to say
that the jury necessarily decided an essential fact. Putting aside
for the moment the question of whether Justice Breyer’s dissent
properly distinguished Descamps, Justice Breyer argued that
when a statute lists alternatives and the prosecutor chooses to
charge only one of them (as in Mathis), the jury would have to
find the charged alternative to convict in that particular case.107
In so arguing, Justice Breyer implicitly based his conclusion on
criminal procedure rules regarding variances—material differences
between the alleged facts in the charging document and the case
at trial.108 If the prosecutor charges a case one way but then
presents it to a jury in another, the defendant may object, and
the judge must decide whether there is a variance. If so, the
court either permits the prosecutor to amend the charging
document or declares a “fatal variance” and acquits the
defendant.109 Justice Breyer believed that the proper focus is
what was necessarily decided in the particular case.
The majority, in contrast, took Taylor’s phrase the “jury
necessarily had to find” as describing what a jury must find in

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248.
See id. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
106 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 597, 602 (1990).
107 As discussed above, Justice Breyer’s attempt to distinguish Mathis as
limited to cases involving an “explicit[ ] list” of alternatives fails to account for
Descamps’s discussion of Schad. See supra note 103.
108 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.6(a) (5th ed. 2000) (“A
variance arises when the proof offered at trial departs from the allegations in the
indictment or information.”); see Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935)
(characterizing the inquiry as “whether there has been such a variance as to ‘affect the
substantial rights’ of the accused”).
109 See Paul M. Coltoff et al., 42 C.J.S. INDICTMENTS § 280 (2017).
104

105
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every case prosecuted under the criminal statute at issue.110
While it may be true that, in an individual case, the jury could
not have convicted without deciding a particular fact, the
majority’s test for whether such a fact is truly “necessary” is
whether it could have been charged in the alternative in the
same count (e.g., in an Iowa burglary case, “a house, a building,
a car, or a boat” each could have been charged).111 “Necessary,”
in this view, means “in all possible cases,” not just the case at
hand. A fact is not truly necessary or essential to an offense
unless the prosecutor must prove it in every case. Only
elements are truly necessary.
To make this disagreement concrete, consider Florida’s
theft statute, which makes it a crime to “temporarily or
permanently” take another’s property.112 Only permanent
takings qualify as a “crime involving moral turpitude” and
trigger the federal consequence of deportation.113 The Florida
Supreme Court has found that the statutory phrase “temporarily
or permanently” refers to alternate means of committing the
crime, rather than alternate elements.114 Alternate means can be
charged in the same count, unlike alternate elements.115 A
prosecutor thus has the option of charging the offense using the
phrase “temporarily or permanently” in a single count. If a
prosecutor opts to charge the case as a “permanent” taking,
Justice Breyer would argue that the jury would necessarily have
to decide whether the taking was permanent (if the case
proceeds to trial).116 In such a case, he would find it appropriate
to rely on the record of conviction under the modified categorical
approach, even though “permanent” is not an element. The
conviction would count as a permanent taking and trigger the
federal consequence. In contrast, the Mathis majority would
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).
Id. at 2255–56.
112 FLA. STAT. § 812.014 (2016).
113 See In re Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 333 (B.I.A. 1973). Recently, the BIA
held that temporary takings can involve moral turpitude if they substantially erode the
owner’s property right. In re Diaz-Lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847, 854–55 (B.I.A. 2016); In
re Obeya, 26 I. & N. Dec. 856, 859 (B.I.A. 2016). Florida’s statute, however, sweeps
broadly and includes de minimis takings. See, e.g., State v. Dunmann, 427 So. 2d 166, 167
(Fla. 1983) (joyriding is criminalized under the theft statute); Peoples v. State, 760 So. 2d
1141, 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (borrowing a fire extinguisher constitutes theft).
114 See Daniels v. State, 587 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 1991).
115 See Schad, 501 U.S. at 631 (citing Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481
(1898)). The prohibition on charging duplicate offenses in the same count stems from a
long line of due process cases. See 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. &
PROC. CRIM. § 142(1), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2017) (collecting cases).
116 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2243, 2260 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how a
jury must find a fact to convict if it is charged as the sole means of commission among
statutory alternatives).
110
111
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contend that, even if the jury had made the “permanent” finding
in the case at hand, this finding is irrelevant because
“permanent” was not required. A prosecutor could have proven
“temporary” and still secured a conviction. Moreover, depending
on the jurisdiction’s rules about variances, jurors could have
disagreed about whether the taking was permanent or
temporary and still reached a unanimous verdict. For the
majority, the prosecutor must always be required to charge (and
the jury must always find) “permanent” for the conviction to
result in removal. “Permanent” must be an element of the
offense of theft to be relevant.
The dispute between the Mathis majority and Justice
Breyer’s dissent is thus a disagreement about the correct level
of analysis: When deciding whether to deport or lengthen a
sentence based on a defendant’s prior conviction, do adjudicators
look at what was necessarily decided in the actual defendant’s
prior case (an inquiry that could involve both means and
elements) or do they look at what must necessarily happen in all
cases involving the same offense (an inquiry into elements only)?
One place to look for the answer is in Justice Kagan’s “25 years”
of precedent.117 As discussed above, Taylor barred sentencing
judges from holding minitrials about the nature of the conduct
underlying a conviction and held that recourse to the record of
conviction was appropriate in cases involving statutory
alternatives to determine what the jury “necessarily” found.118
Although the Court used the term “element” twelve times, it
did not discuss the means versus elements distinction.119 Nor
did the Court specify that its use of the term “necessarily”
referred to what happens in all cases, as opposed to the case at
hand.120 As Justice Breyer pointed out in his Mathis dissent,
the Court has used the term “elements” interchangeably with
statutory “definition.”121 As discussed above, in dicta, the Court
in Taylor sanctioned review of the record to categorize a
conviction under a hypothetical burglary statute written in the
disjunctive.122 But it did so without stating whether the possible
statutory alternatives were means or elements.
For its part, Shepard is also not particularly helpful in
settling the dispute between the Mathis majority and the
dissent about what it means to say a fact was necessarily found.
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 2247.
See supra Section I.A.
See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 578–602 (1990).
See id.
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2265 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
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As discussed above, the Court in Shepard extended Taylor to
cases involving pleas and rejected the government’s suggestion
that sentencing judges could look at police reports in plea
cases.123 The Court used the word “elements” in its analysis but
again made no contrast with means.124 The Massachusetts
burglary statute at issue was written in the alternative, and the
Court reviewed the record of conviction without first specifying
whether the statutory alternatives were elements or means.125
As Justice Alito later noted in his dissent in Descamps, the
Massachusetts burglary statute likely would not be divisible
under the Descamps majority’s rule.126
Three basic possibilities exist for the ambiguity in Taylor
and Shepard about whether the term “necessarily” refers to
what happened in a particular case (which could include means)
or what must happen in all cases (which must be an element).
The Court could have (1) assumed that the different statutory
alternatives it discussed were elements rather than means (the
Mathis majority’s reading); (2) intentionally not addressed
whether alternatives had to be elements because the Court
thought it did not matter for sentencing purposes (Justice
Breyer’s view); or (3) simply failed to resolve the ambiguity
because the difference between elements and means was not
raised as an issue (perhaps the most likely). Only in Descamps
did the Court expressly invoke the contrast between means and
elements.127 The upshot is that contrary to Justice Kagan’s
contention, Taylor and Shepard did not “all but resolve[ ] ”
Descamps.128 Descamps, however, did all but resolve Mathis.
III.

WHY DESCAMPS AND MATHIS ARE CORRECT

The Court’s use of the term “elements” in its categorical
approach jurisprudence for the last twenty-five years may not
be the best justification for the holdings of Descamps and
Mathis. But the holdings are nonetheless correct. Categorizations
of convictions, as opposed to conduct, must focus on what the
prosecution must prove in every case, not just the particular
case at hand. The distinction between elements and means
corresponds to the difference between convictions and conduct,
See supra Section I.B.
See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19 (2005).
125 Id. at 20–21.
126 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2297 (2013) (stating that “the
Court assumes that ‘building’ and the other locations enumerated in the Massachusetts
statutes [in Shepard], such as ‘vessel,’ were alternative elements, but that is questionable”).
127 See supra Section I.C.
128 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283.
123
124
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as those terms are used in the relevant sentencing and
immigration statutes. Even if ambiguity exists on this point,
the statutory interpretation norm of avoiding constitutional
questions would require this interpretation.129 While it is true
that there may be challenges when implementing the Mathis
decision, this unfortunate reality is equally true of the approach
outlined in Justice Breyer’s dissent.130 In the absence of wholesale
revision to federal enhancement statutes and immigration law,
determining the nature of prior convictions will always involve
some measure of complexity.131
A.

Conduct Versus Conviction

As noted above, the Supreme Court has justified the
categorical approach on the grounds that Congress used the
word conviction rather than conduct in the relevant sentencing
and immigration statutes.132 Under the norms governing statutory
interpretation, different words must be given different meanings.133
While both the Mathis majority and the dissent agree that there
is a difference between the use of the statutory terms conviction
and conduct, they disagree about what that difference is.
Their disagreement, in part, collapses into their
disagreement about what constitutes a necessarily decided fact.
For the Mathis majority, the conviction/conduct distinction lines
up with the distinction between what is necessarily decided in
all cases (the elements) and all other facts (including means).134
For Justice Breyer, the conviction/conduct distinction lines up
with the distinction between facts necessarily decided in a given
case, including elements and specified statutory means, and
truly irrelevant facts (i.e., facts other than specified statutory
means).135 In other words, sentencing judges do not violate the
129 Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, “where a statute is
susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt
the latter.” United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909). For a discussion of the difference between avoiding a constitutional question and
avoiding unconstitutionality, see Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus
Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 331 (2015).
130 See infra Section III.D.
131 Complexity is distinct from indeterminacy. Rebecca Sharpless, Clear and
Simple Deportation Rules for Crimes: Why We Need Them and Why It’s Hard to Get
Them, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 933, 939–41 (2015).
132 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
133 NORMAN
J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 46.06, 194 (6th ed. 2000) (“The use of different terms within related
statutes generally implies that different meanings were intended.”).
134 See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251–52 (2016).
135 Id. at 2260–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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prohibition on inquiring into conduct if they only rely on what
was necessarily decided in the particular prior criminal case. In
the Florida theft example above, Justice Breyer would argue
that judges cannot be characterized as inquiring into “conduct”
if a defendant was actually charged with a “permanent” taking,
even if “permanent” is not an element of the offense.136
The Mathis majority is correct. As discussed above, the
Mathis dissent’s position is premised on stringent rules
regarding variances between what is charged and what is
proven at trial.137 If a single means is charged, Justices Breyer
and Ginsburg assume it must be proven at trial.138 But this
assumption is unwarranted. Courts are split on the question of
when a variance between the means named in a charging
document and the one proved at trial is fatal.139 For example, in
the Florida theft example above, there is no guarantee that a
trial judge would declare a fatal variance if the prosecutor
charged a permanent taking but proved a temporary one at
trial. The dissent’s confidence that variances will result in
failed convictions is misplaced. The only way to be sure that a
fact was necessarily found is if it is an element—a fact that
must be proven in all cases.140
The dissent’s position is also contrary to the longstanding
legal understanding of what a conviction is, especially as it
contrasts with conduct. The legal term conviction is defined in
terms of its constitutive elements.141 At no point does Justice
Breyer directly address why the term should not have this
traditional meaning.
In sum, to talk about a conviction, as opposed to conduct,
is to talk about the elements of the offense—what a prosecutor
must prove in every case. The conviction/conduct distinction is
See supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
138 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
139 See Coltoff et al., supra note 109, § 286 (“According to some authority, when a
crime can be committed by several acts, a variance between the act named in the
indictment and the act proved is not fatal. However, there is also authority that where an
offense may be committed in various ways, the evidence must establish it to have been
committed in the mode charged in the indictment.” (footnote omitted)).
140 While courts disagree on the circumstances in which different means can be
alleged than are proven at trial, there is no disagreement that alternate elements cannot
be charged in the same count. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text. Nor can
one offense be charged and another proven at trial. To the extent that prosecutors violate
this rule, it is subject to challenge. As discussed above, prosecutorial practice does not
establish whether alternatives are means or elements, only state law does. To the extent
that the Mathis dicta about taking a “peek” at the record of conviction suggest otherwise,
this is incorrect. See infra Part IV.
141 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”).
136
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best understood as a restatement of the elements/means
distinction. As explained below, the norm of statutory
construction that requires courts to avoid constitutional questions
supports this view.
B.

The Apprendi Problem

The real source of Justice Breyer’s hostility to a true
elements test may be his underlying disagreement with
Apprendi. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a trial by jury requires that
any fact that raises the maximum possible penalty for a crime,
other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be decided by the
jury, not a judge.142 Justice Breyer—an author of the federal
sentencing guidelines—dissented in Apprendi on the grounds
that “[a] sentencing system in which judges have discretion to
find sentencing-related factors is a workable system and one
that has long been thought consistent with the Constitution”
and “the Constitution treat[s] sentencing statutes” the same.143
Rather than reiterate his opposition to Apprendi, Justice
Breyer brushed off the Apprendi issue presented in Mathis. In
his view, when the assessment of what the jury necessarily
found in an individual case is easy, there is no Apprendi problem
because the judge is not making an independent finding.144 Thus,
[w]here, as [in Mathis], the State charges only one kind of “occupied
structure”—namely, entry into a “garage”—[Apprendi’s] criterion is
met. The State must prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant unlawfully entered a garage. And that is so,
whether the statute uses the term “garage” to refer to a fact that is a
means or a fact that is an element.145

Drawing this inference from the record of conviction is not as
easy as Justice Breyer suggests, however. As discussed above,
courts disagree about when a variance between a charging
document and judgment is fatal.146 There is no guarantee that
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (N.J. 2000).
Id. at 559 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was chief counsel of the
Senate Judiciary Committee and helped Congress adopt a bill that became the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See Linda Greenhouse, Guidelines on Sentencing Are
Flawed, Justice Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/21/
us/guidelines-on-sentencing-are-flawed-justice-says.html [https://perma.cc/7Z4E-Y258].
He served from 1985 to 1989 “as one of the original members of the United States
Sentencing Commission.” Id. For a discussion by Justice Breyer regarding the drafting
of the sentencing guidelines, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises on Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
144 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2265 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 2265.
146 See supra notes 108–109, 139–140 and accompanying text.
142

143
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the prosecutor must prove “garage” at trial if “garage” is
charged. Under Justice Breyer’s approach, judges would have
to research state law to be sure that the conviction comes from
a jurisdiction that has a strict law forbidding variance between
a charged means and evidence at trial. Even if a jurisdiction
has strict rules on variances, judges would still have to review
the entire record of conviction to see if the initial charging
document was amended and to ensure that the judgment reflects
the same charge as the charging document. It is thus burdensome
to answer a basic question raised by Justice Breyer’s position:
What counts as a sufficiently easy inference? The mere
possibility that the factual determination of what was
necessarily found can sometimes be difficult proves that the
inquiry goes beyond the simple “fact” of conviction. An Apprendi
problem exists if judges are making inferences, even ones that
appear simple. Moreover, the vast majority of criminal cases
result in a plea rather than a jury verdict.147 Thus, to talk about
what the jury necessarily found is by definition theoretical, as
the jury decides nothing in plea cases.
The problem disappears only if judges limit themselves
to the legal inquiry of what elements constitute the offense.
Because a prior conviction is the totality of its elements, it
follows that any fact beyond the elements of the prior
conviction requires a jury verdict and cannot be decided by a
judge. Stated another way, a judge cannot impose a federal
consequence—like a longer prison term or deportation—based
on the means of commission, even if it is listed in the criminal
statute and even if found by the jury. In Mathis, the burglary
conviction could not serve as a basis for the sentencing
enhancement, even though the prosecutor charged the unlawful
entry as into a “garage” and the jury at trial would have been
required to find “garage” to convict.148
Although Justice Breyer presented his position as
complying with Apprendi, he, in fact, proposed an entirely new
rule. In essence, he urged the Court to replace Apprendi’s
phrase “the fact of a prior conviction”149 with the fact of any
element or means necessarily found by the jury. Of course,
Justice Breyer might respond by arguing that the term
“conviction” does not refer only to elements, but also to
necessarily decided means. But this point circles us back to the
147 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
148 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257.
149 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (N.J. 2000) (employing the phrase
“the fact of a prior conviction”).
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above discussion of whether the conviction/conduct distinction
tracks the elements/means one.
Apprendi’s “prior conviction” exception relied on the
“certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any ‘fact’ of
prior conviction.”150 In the proceedings relating to the prior
conviction, defendants were entitled to the full array of procedural
protections, including trial by jury on every fact necessary to the
charged offense.151 For the reasons discussed above, however,
these “procedural safeguards” did not necessarily apply to alleged
facts that were not elements of the offense.152 The only way for
recidivist sentencing to be based on procedurally safeguarded
facts is for sentencing judges to engage in the purely legal
inquiry of reviewing the elements of the prior conviction. In
Mathis, the judge could not lawfully lengthen a federal sentence
under the ACCA based on the Idaho burglary conviction because
there was no “certainty” that a jury would have found the fact
that made the Idaho offense fit the definition of federal generic
burglary (i.e., entry into a structure rather than a nonstructure,
like an automobile).153
It is far from clear that the prior conviction exception to
Apprendi’s general rule even applies to cases like Descamps
and Mathis. The prior conviction exception stems from the
Court’s pre-Apprendi decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, a case in which the nature of the conviction was
uncontested.154 In contrast, Descamps and Mathis had contested
the nature of their prior records.155 Moreover, as the Court
emphasized in Apprendi, the holding in Almendarez-Torres was,
“at best,” an exception to the general rule that a jury must find
any fact that increases the maximum penalty for a crime.156 The
days may be numbered for the prior conviction exception. As the
Court acknowledged, “it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was

Id. at 488.
See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968) (right to jury trial in
criminal cases).
152 See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
154 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (The defendant in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), “had admitted the three earlier convictions for aggravated
felonies—all of which had been entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial
procedural safeguards of their own—no question concerning the right to a jury trial or the
standard of proof that would apply to a contested issue of fact was before the Court.”).
155 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2282 (2013); Mathis v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2250 (2016).
156 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487.
150
151
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incorrectly decided, and that a logical application of our reasoning
today should apply if the recidivist issue were contested.”157
The Sixth Amendment problem identified by Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority almost three decades ago in
Taylor, is thus significant.158 Even if ambiguity exists about
whether the term conviction means the sum of the elements of an
offense, courts must avoid a statutory interpretation that presents
a serious constitutional question. The categorical approach is not
based solely on Congress’s use of the word conviction or the
impracticality of judges delving into the underlying conduct.159
The Court in Descamps and Mathis was wise to steer clear of the
Sixth Amendment issue.
The Apprendi problem not only affects federal
sentencing cases but immigration cases as well. Although the
Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury does not apply in civil
immigration cases, the Supreme Court has held that terms
common to both federal recidivist sentencing statutes and
immigration law must have the same meaning.160 The same
categorical approach applies in both the federal sentencing and
immigration contexts.161 Any interpretation dictated by the
cannon of avoiding a constitutional question in the sentencing
context thus applies with equal force in the immigration context.162
C.

Extraneous Facts

The Mathis majority defended its means/elements
categorical approach on the basis that it was fairer to defendants
than the method proposed by the dissent. The Court noted that
defendants have no incentive to dispute “extraneous facts”

157 Id. at 489–90 (footnote omitted). Supporting this prediction is the fact that
Justice Thomas, who was in the majority in Almendarez-Torres, has since changed his
position and disagrees with the “prior conviction” exception to the Apprendi rule. Id. at
520–21 (Thomas, J., concurring).
158 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
159 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
160 See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does
not govern civil cases.”). Terms that appear in both the INA and the federal criminal code
“must [be] interpret[ed] . . . consistently, whether [the Court] encounter[s] its application in
a criminal or noncriminal context.” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).
161 See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013) (citing to both
immigration and criminal sentencing cases when explaining the categorical approach);
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 n.8 (The term “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16 means the
same in both criminal and noncriminal contexts.); In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N.
Dec. 349, 353–54 (2014), vacated in part by In re Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I. & N. Dec. 478
(2015) (recognizing that the categorical approach is the same in both contexts).
162 See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385–85 (2005) (holding that a
statutory interpretation based on constitutional avoidance applies in all cases, even
those not presenting a constitutional problem).
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because they, by definition, do not affect the possible sentence.163
This dissent did not dispute this point but argued that defendants
do have the incentive to dispute a fact that is a means when it is
the only alternative charged.164 In this scenario, the alternate
means ceases to become extraneous, and the defendant had better
dispute the alleged means if he or she hopes to prevail.
The dissent’s observation may be true in cases that
proceed to trial. But an overwhelming number of cases result in
plea agreements.165 As the Mathis majority points out, in plea
cases, the defendant has no incentive to dispute the facts that
are not elements because they are irrelevant to the sentence.
They would only become relevant later in federal recidivist
sentencing or immigration proceedings. The lack of incentive to
contest non-element facts weighs in favor of the Mathis
majority’s approach requiring that the nature of a prior
conviction turn only on its elements.
D.

Practicality

Justice Breyer’s Mathis dissent characterized the
assessment of prior state convictions under the majority opinion
as “a time-consuming legal tangle.”166 Because “there are very
few States where one can find authoritative judicial opinions
that decide the means/element question,” Justice Breyer
suggested that “[t]he parties will have to look to other state
cases to decide whether that fact is a ‘means’ or an ‘element.’”167
While it is true that researching state law can be complex,
courts already must inquire into whether a fact is a means or an
element to perform other, standard legal inquiries. As Justice
Thomas has noted: “Courts have long had to consider which
facts are elements in order to determine the sufficiency of an
accusation.”168 The Court, when previously addressing the
difference between elements and means, had no concerns about
the viability of the endeavor of discerning means from elements
in state law.169

See supra notes 91–92, 104 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105, 107–109 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
166 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2264 (2016).
167 Id.
168 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 500–01 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). This inquiry is also central to the double jeopardy analysis.
169 Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991) (The “question whether statutory
alternatives constitute independent elements of the offense . . . is a substantial question
of statutory construction.”).
163

164
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Moreover, Justice Breyer’s suggestion that adjudicators
look to the law of other states is also misplaced, as states are
separate sovereigns when it comes to defining the elements of
offenses. The better rule is to resolve any ambiguity in favor of
the defendant according to the longstanding rule of lenity.170
Finally, Justice Breyer underestimates the amount of time his
version of the modified categorical approach would require. As
discussed above, even apparently easy cases may not be that
simple. Evaluating a record of conviction requires not only
reviewing documents other than the charging document but
also researching state law on variances.
IV.

MATHIS’S TAKE A “PEEK” DICTA IS INCONSISTENT WITH
ITS HOLDING

Although Justice Breyer downplayed the practical
difficulty of his test for when the modified categorical approach
applies, he correctly identified the concern that few state courts
have rendered definitive rulings on whether alternatives are
elements or means. As mentioned above, eager to allay concerns
about the possible inconclusiveness and difficulty of the
elements/means inquiry, the Mathis majority suggested, in
dicta, that the answer in ambiguous cases can involve taking a
“peek” at the record of conviction.171 According to Justice Kagan,
“if state law fails to provide clear answers, federal judges have
another place to look: the record of a prior conviction itself…for
‘the sole and limited purpose of determining whether [the listed
items are] element[s] of the offense.’”172
The take a “peek” suggestion was not only unnecessary
to the Mathis holding but inconsistent with it. The idea that
adjudicators can research state law by looking at the record of
conviction in a particular case misapprehends the nature of the
means/elements question. The means/elements inquiry is not
factual. In holding that the modified categorical approach turns
on whether listed statutory alternatives are means or elements,
the Court acknowledged that state law controls whether a fact is
170 Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014); United States v.
Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 519 (2008); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971).
Immigration law also has a cannon of statutory construction that requires courts to
resolve ambiguity in deportation statutes in favor of the immigrant. Leocal v. Ashcroft,
543 U.S. 1, 12 n.8 (2004); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 201, 320 (2001) (citing INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987)).
171 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2256–57 (2016) (citing Rendon v.
Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 473–74 (9th Cir. 2015) (Graber, J., dissenting)). This suggestion
qualifies as dicta because Idaho law provided a definitive answer to the means/element
question in Mathis’s case. Id. at 2256.
172 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Rendon, 782 F.3d at 473–74).
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a means or element.173 By definition, the inquiry into state law is
legal, not factual.
Whether state prosecutors charge in the alternative as a
matter of practice is a question of fact that has no bearing on
the legal question of whether state law treats the alternatives
as means or elements. Because prosecutors could be routinely
mischarging an offense, the record of conviction is irrelevant to
settling the means versus elements question.
Even if the question of what state law requires were
evidentiary rather than legal, no inference could be drawn from
charging documents that list only one alternative. A simple
example illustrates this point. Assume in the Florida theft
example above that state law is silent as to whether the phrase
“temporary or permanent” defines alternate means or alternate
elements. In the face of this uncertainty, an immigration judge
peeks at the charging document in various cases to see how
Florida prosecutors actually charge the theft offense. The judge
finds that the offense is sometimes charged as “permanent.”
What inference, if any, should the judge draw? The answer is
none at all. The fact that a prosecutor charges a single statutory
alternative is indeterminate. The prosecutor could have been
prosecuting a single alternative because the alternatives are
elements, which must be charged separately. Or, the prosecutor
could have chosen to prosecute the case by charging only one of
two alternate means.
The converse of this scenario, however, cuts in favor of
the immigrant facing deportation. If theft is charged in a single
count as “temporary or permanent,” this practice indicates that
the prosecutor was treating the alternatives as means rather
than separate offenses. As explained above, two offenses cannot
be charged in the same count.174
Mathis must be read as requiring courts to engage in the
purely legal inquiry of whether state law treats alternatives as
means or elements. To interpret the take a “peek” dicta in
Mathis as sanctioning an evidentiary inquiry into prosecutorial
practice conflicts with the Court’s holding that the modified
categorical inquiry is an elements test. Moreover, by permitting
review of the record of conviction, it threatens to collapse the
difference between the Mathis majority and Justice Breyer’s
dissent. In the absence of definitive state law that treats the

173
174

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.
See supra note 115.
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alternatives as separate elements, statutory alternatives must
be construed as means (thus making the statute indivisible).175
The Mathis holding requires sentencing enhancement
and deportation to function like “an on-off switch.”176 Either
every conviction under a statute can be used as a predicate
offense for enhancement or deportation, or none can. In this
view, it would be theoretically possible (though timeconsuming) to make a list of all the separate state and federal
offenses that could serve as ACCA or deportation predicate
offenses. Statutes containing language in the alternative would
have to be analyzed to see if they define means or elements.
Alternatives that carry different sentences would be easy, as
these must be elements. If no controlling state decision holds
that an alternative is an element, the presumption must be
that it merely states an alternate means. Such a list would be
possible because the Mathis methodology does not turn on
anything specific about an individual case. The only purpose of
individual records of conviction is to tell a sentencing or
immigration judge what statutory offense was at issue, which
would then enable consultation of a list.177
Under the Mathis dissent’s view, and under the take a
“peek” dicta, no comprehensive list would be possible. Because
the dissent would have the analysis focus on what was
necessarily decided in a particular case and permit review of
the record of conviction whenever alternatives are listed, it
would not be possible to generate a list that included statutes
written with alternatives (as many are). As discussed above,
whether a conviction could serve as a predicate for ACCA
enhancement or deportation would turn on how the prosecutor
opted to charge the individual case, among other things.
Moreover, if adjudicators were able to look at the record of
conviction to determine the means/elements question, the
individual record of conviction could affect the outcome of this
determination, thus preventing the generation of a list that is
valid in all cases. Because the Mathis majority paves the way
175 See Brief of the National Ass’n of Federal Defenders and the National Ass’n
of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22, Mathis v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (Feb. 29, 2016) (“[I]f there is no clear legal assurance that
a statutory definition would ‘necessarily require an adjudicator to find the generic
offense,’ courts must presume that a defendant has not been ‘convicted of’ that generic
offense.” (quoting Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013))).
176 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2287 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
601 (1990)) (stating “no one suggested that a particular crime might sometimes count
towards enhancement and sometimes not, depending on the facts of the case.” (quoting
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601)).
177 Id. at 2285.
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for the creation of a list, which could then be mechanically
applied to individual cases, its approach would generate more
determinate results than that of the dissent, which would rely
more on the review of individual documents.
The concern behind Justice Breyer’s objection to the
Mathis holding may be that many attempts at sentencing
enhancements will fail, as ambiguity about whether a fact is a
means or an element under state law should be resolved in
favor of the defendant.178 But this concern distills down to
either an objection to Apprendi—which Justice Breyer believes
was wrongly decided—or an objection to the presumption of
innocence and requirement that guilt be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt—core constitutional principles that the Court
since its earliest days has defended.179
CONCLUSION
The Court’s path to Descamps and Mathis may not have
been as predetermined by prior precedent as Justice Kagan would
have liked, but these decisions have cemented the categorical
approach as a true elements test. Properly interpreted, and
ignoring the take a “peek” dicta, these cases stand as a bulwark
against government overreach in recidivist sentencing and
deportation proceedings. In an era in which people on both sides
of the political spectrum criticize the United States as overly
punitive, an elements test ameliorates harsh sentencing and
deportation laws and practices by ensuring a strict
correspondence between the offense in question and the federal
sentencing or immigration consequence.
Congress could respond by amending the law to
mandate that recidivist sentencing and deportation turn on
conduct rather than a conviction. Justice Kennedy has invited
Congress to do just this.180 But such a change in course would
not only involve time-consuming “minitrials”181 on the nature of
the prior conduct but, in the sentencing context, it would
squarely present the Sixth Amendment issue. Only a true
elements test for recidivist sentencing satisfies the Sixth
Amendment requirement that a jury decides all facts—apart
See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 446, 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Estelle
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) (“The presumption of innocence . . . is a basic
component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice.”).
180 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2258 (2016) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
181 Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013) (citing Chambers v.
United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009)).
178
179
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from the fact of a prior conviction—that raise the maximum
possible sentence.182
To date, Congress has not accepted Justice Kennedy’s
invitation to revisit the basis for recidivist sentencing. It could
be that the political will for such a move does not exist. If and
when the political winds change, the constitutional challenge—
with roots at least as far back as Taylor—will prove a formidable
barrier. For now, Descamps and Mathis correctly interpret
federal sentencing enhancement statutes, and by extension
deportation provisions, to mandate a true elements test.

182

See supra Section III.B.

